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This thesis examines the prospects for closer Israeli-NATO cooperation by analyzing the 
historical context and possible benefits and constraints of developing the relationship. 
Starting from the inception of NATO and the establishment of Israel, the analysis 
considers the experiences of the small Middle Eastern nation and the large collective 
defense organization. Israel’s limited experiences in multilateral settings, its doctrine of 
self-reliance, Turkey’s critical role, and the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict have 
constrained NATO and Israel from cultivating the full potential of the relationship. Of all 
the impediments, the Israel-Palestinian conflict stands out as the most significant, an 
undercurrent to them all. Despite Israel’s growing isolation in the Middle East, Israel and 
NATO have gained significant ground in deepening their bilateral relationship. Facing 
similar threats from common radical adversaries, both Israel and NATO stand to gain 
significant benefits in further developing the partnership. In order to gain more support 
from the members of NATO, as well as for other reasons, Israel must take progressive 
steps toward a peaceful resolution with the Palestinians. 
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What are the prospects for closer Israeli-North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) cooperation? This thesis will investigate factors that support closer cooperation 
between Israel and NATO, such as shared political values and security interests, and 
factors that complicate and constrain collaboration, such as disagreements on the 
Palestinian question and the divergent economic and political interests of specific NATO 
Allies in the Middle East. The thesis will examine Israeli-NATO relations since 1949, the 
evolution of Israeli views on NATO, and the development of policies toward Israel of 
influential NATO Allies. 
From a historical perspective, the following topics will be examined: NATO’s 
interests in the Middle East, NATO’s position on Israeli security, contemporary Israeli 
perceptions of NATO, the evolution of the Israeli-NATO relationship since 1949, and the 
potential benefits and costs of a closer Israeli-NATO partnership. NATO’s current policy 
on enlargement and partnership will be considered as well as the political and security 
factors that may support closer cooperation. Given the historical development of NATO, 
Israel, and their cooperation, the thesis will assess the extent to which a closer NATO-
Israeli partnership is probable, the circumstances that might promote it, and its potential 
implications. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Instability within the Middle East has been persistent since World War I. The 
conflicts of the Middle East are not held within the confines of the ill-fated post-Ottoman 
borders. The establishment of Israel in 1948 introduced a new and enduring factor in the 
region’s politics. Powers external to the Middle East, including the United States and 
Russia, took sides in the Israeli-Arab struggle, heightening Middle Eastern volatility with 
proxy wars. The spread of Islamic extremism throughout the Middle East further 
complicated attempts to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. Although several struggles rage 
within the Middle East, the Israeli-Arab conflict is a consistent variable in the region’s 
instability. 
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The United States befriended Israel from the founding of the new state in 1948. 
Washington maintains a strong bond with Israel, the only stable democracy in the Middle 
East. Since 1948, the United States has shown unquestionable resolve to support the State 
of Israel. While the Israeli-Arab conflict has persisted and evolved, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union obliged NATO to adapt its policies to contemporary problems. The NATO 
Allies created the Alliance in 1949 in order to deter Soviet expansionism. In NATO’s 
latest Strategic Concept (2010), the Alliance has reaffirmed its determination to be 
prepared for collective defense, to deal with all stages of crises, and to promote 
cooperative security. Specifically, the Strategic Concept notes dynamic political shifts 
and extremism as factors aggravating the instability of the world. A founding member of 
NATO, the United States is politically entrenched in the Middle East. Israel’s proximity 
to Europe, its democratic political system, and its special relationship with the United 
States have helped to draw attention to the possibility of a greater Israeli-NATO 
partnership. 
The implications of a deeper Israeli-NATO partnership are as convoluted as its 
prospects. Some NATO members have taken opposite sides on the regional conflict 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. NATO’s enlargement since the end of the Cold 
War has led to its engrossment into issues of the newly added states. Since 1991, NATO 
has also undertaken an immense array of partnership activities. In a broader partnership 
with Israel, NATO would undoubtedly thicken its involvement, and perhaps become as 
entangled in the Israeli-Arab conflict as the United States. If a deeper partnership with 
Israel evolved into possible membership, NATO would have to amend Article 10 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty to allow a non-European state to enter the alliance. According to 
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, “by unanimous agreement,” the Allies may invite 
“any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty.”1 The 
political consequences of NATO’s entrenchment in Middle Eastern affairs could be even 
more complex if NATO chose to support Israel in the Israeli-Arab conflict. As the United 
States is continually faulted by Muslim nations for its unquestionable resolve to support 
the State of Israel, NATO would also be criticized if it chose to align with Israel in 
                                                 
1 North Atlantic Treaty art. 10, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
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opposition to the state’s antagonists. Therefore, NATO-Israeli relations continue to 
evolve, a deeper partnership can only be built on a foundation of a Palestinian-Israeli 
peace agreement. 
B. METHOD 
Utilizing a comparative analysis, NATO and Israeli interests, benefits, and 
constraints in pursuing closer cooperation will be compared and contrasted to determine 
the feasibility of greater collaboration. The critical argument, Israel’s need to resolve the 
Palestinian conflict, will be illustrated through the perceptions of the Israeli government 
and NATO. Factors and variables of shared interests and collaboration constraints will be 
evaluated. The Israeli-NATO relationship will be surveyed through articles, studies, and 
government documentation. The hypothesis will be investigated through an analysis of 
the historical development of NATO-Israeli relations. 
C. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will 
continue to isolate Israel and constrain its ability to establish a closer NATO-Israeli 
partnership. As an alliance that shares the same fundamental core values as Israel, NATO 
will hesitate to cultivate a closer partnership with Israel, unless Israel resolves the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is very little literature on the potential for a greater Israeli-NATO 
partnership. Although there are no book-length studies, there are a two “policy papers 
outlining the rationale for full NATO membership of Israel—one written by two 
Americans, Ron Asmus and Bruce Jackson, and the other written by Uzi Arad, Oded 
Eran, and Tommy Steiner.”2 Additionally, there is a formal “Israeli proposal to upgrade 
relations in January 2005,” and a report by Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar 
                                                 
2 Tommy Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations: The Level of Ambition,” Italian Atlantic Committee, 
2014, http://www.comitatoatlantico.it/en/studi/nato-israel-relations-the-level-of-ambition/. 
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titled NATO – An Alliance for Freedom.3 The bulk of the literature consists of articles by 
scholars, mainly political scientists and historians, debating the idea of Israeli 
membership in NATO and the prospects and implications of deeper Israeli-NATO 
partnership. 
In 2005, Ronald Asmus, then the executive director of the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, and Bruce Jackson, president of the Project on Transatlantic 
Democracies, wrote that the “Euro-Atlantic community itself has undergone a profound 
process of transformation since the end of the Cold War, shifting its strategic focus east 
and south toward the wider Middle East,” and initiating dialogue on Israeli-NATO and 
Israeli-EU relations.4 Asmus and Jackson contended that Israel, the United States, and 
NATO would gain a great deal from a closer Israeli-NATO partnership.5 
Jose Maria Aznar, Prime Minister of Spain in 1996–2004, contended in the 
Alliance of Freedom report that “we must support Israel in its fight against terror. We 
must recognize that although the Israelis are fighting for themselves, they are also 
fighting for us all.”6 As NATO and the United States have been involved in Middle 
Eastern politics, Israel “should aspire to have the closest possible relations with the actors 
and institutions setting those policies.”7 Additionally, Aznar wrote, NATO can become a 
“critical element in helping to provide the security Israel will need to take steps to make 
peace with a Palestinian state in the Middle East.”8 
Asmus and Jackson asserted that a closer NATO-Israeli partnership would “end 
Israel’s political and diplomatic isolation and strengthen Israel’s position vis-à-vis other 
                                                 
3 Steiner, “NATO-Israeli Relations.” 
4 Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, “Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO,” Policy Review 
129 (February–March 2005): 47, http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_news_article_attachments/FP_Asmus_ 
Does_Israel_Belong_in_the_EU_and_NATO.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 





parts of the world, including its adversaries in the Middle East.”9 The United States 
would benefit by narrowing “the transatlantic rift over how to deal with Israel.”10 
European actors would “move from the sidelines to center stage in the peace process and 
Middle East politics more generally.” Although “many Europeans could be concerned 
that they are being drawn into potential conflicts and assuming new risks in the region,” 
solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be a significant variable in stabilizing the 
Middle East. Asmus and Jackson argued that Israel must “decide whether it wants to 
pursue a Euro-Atlantic upgrade.”11 Israel could begin, Asmus and Jackson suggested, by 
negotiating with the Palestinians and “turning to those NATO nations that it considers to 
be friends and that are likely to be most interested in developing this relationship.”12 
Three Israeli experts—Uzi Arad (Chairman of Israel’s Institute of Defense 
Studies), Oded Eran (a former Israeli Ambassador to NATO), and Tommy Steiner (a 
senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center, 
Herzliya)— compiled a proposal contending that the ever-growing presence of terrorism, 
shared interests and ideologies, and proximity to Europe have made Israel a country of 
potential strategic interest to NATO.13 The threats that the NATO Allies face, “mainly 
radical Islam, global terrorism, and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), are same threats Israel faces.”14 Zaki Shalom of the Jaffe Center of Strategic 
Studies asserted “the major threat” against “which NATO is supposed to defend, comes 
from radical Islam, whose primary sources of power lie mainly in the Middle East.”15 
Israeli principles parallel those of Western and European democratic political regimes in 
                                                 
9 Asmus and Jackson, “Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO,” 50. 
10 Ibid., 53. 
11 Ibid., 55. 
12 Ibid., 56. 
13 Uzi Arad, Oded Eran, and Tommy Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community: 
Further Upgrading and Institutionalizing NATO-Israel Relations,” (working paper, Interdisciplinary Center 
Herzliya, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy Institute for Policy and Strategy, 
Herzilya Conference, Herzilya, Israel, January 21–24, 2007), 1, http://www.herzliyaconference.org/ 
_Uploads/2469NATO.pdf. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Zaki Shalom, “Israel and NATO: Opportunities and Risks,” Strategic Assessment 7, no. 4 (March 
2005), http://jewishpoliticalchronicle.org/mar05/Israel%20and%20NATo.pdf. 
 6 
a region hostile to liberties and freedoms. Democracy and the rule of law are also 
consistent with NATO policy.16 Tommy Steiner asserted that NATO-Israeli relations will 
be determined by NATO’s “implementation of its new partnership policy; its role as an 
alliance and capacity to deepen Western strategic cooperation and defense integration; 
and its strategic-military role in an increasingly volatile Middle East.”17 Steiner further 
contended that Israel must take steps to accept multilateral cooperation and engage in 
negotiations that will end the Palestinian conflict.18 
According to Martin van Creveld, NATO and Israel have begun to frame their 
relationship through the Individual Cooperation Program (ICP).19 Israel has shown a 
steady will to participate in various NATO exercises. In 2001, Israel was the first state 
within the Mediterranean Dialogue framework to sign a security agreement with 
NATO.20 The security agreement provides “a framework for the protection of classified 
information.”21 In December 2004, Israel took part in the “first Mediterranean Dialogue-
NATO meeting at the level of foreign ministers.”22 Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer came to Israel in 2005 in his official capacity, just as the first joint Israel-NATO 
naval exercise was taking place.23 That same year, Israel joined the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly and “Israeli troops participated in NATO exercises in both the Mediterranean 
and Ukraine.”24 Having conducted only 35 events in the first decade since its inception, 
the Mediterranean Dialogue lacked “a clear vision” of “goals, objectives, and cooperation 
programs.”25 The Herzilya proposal explains that the dialogue eventually matured 
                                                 
16 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 1. 
17 Steiner, “NATO-Israel Relations.” 
18 Ibid. 
19 Martin van Creveld, “NATO, Israel and Peace in the Middle East,” North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, n.d., http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/Middle-East/Peace-Middle-East-Israel/EN/ 
index.htm. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 1. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Van Creveld, “NATO, Israel and Peace.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 Steiner, “NATO-Israel Relations.” 
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because of two main reasons: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the rise in 
tensions caused by the Second Intifada in 2000–2005.26 
Israel’s determination to deepen its partnership with NATO comes just as “the 
vast majority of NATO allies want to transform the alliance … to meet new strategic 
challenges and threats.”27 The Herzliya proposal argues that NATO should tailor its new 
partnerships by giving special recognition to those that “serve NATO’s goals and 
missions,” placing Israel at the forefront of candidates.28 However, “the assessment based 
… on two years of informal meetings … in Israel, Europe, and North America, co-
organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Atlantic Forum of 
Israel,” found the following issues:29 Israel’s multilateral inexperience, the mixed 
prospects for Israeli-European cooperation, the need for a step by step process, and the 
Turkish-Israeli dilemma.30 
Multilateral Inexperience – Although many “governments find multilateral 
cooperation with other like-minded governments a most effective and efficient form of 
governance,” Israel has very limited experience in the realm, and functions mostly 
bilaterally.
31
 Israel prefers bilateral cooperation due to the additional constraints usually 
associated with multilateral agreements. Moreover, Israel has historically not been able to 
pursue its interests in a multilateral forum. In most international forums, “the 
overwhelming … majority that Arab and Muslim countries muster … has led Israel to 
generally perceive these organizations as hostile.”32 For example, Israel was only 
accepted into a United Nations (UN) regional group, the Western European and Others 
Group, in 2002, and it is still excluded from “all other UN regional group systems.”33 
                                                 
26 Steiner, “NATO-Israel Relations.” 
27 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 1–13. 
31 Ibid., 2–4. 
32 Ibid., 3. 
33 Ibid. 
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Lastly, multilateral cooperation is usually regionally based. Israel does not currently have 
the regional relationships necessary to pursue such cooperation. 
Mixed Prospects for Israeli-European Cooperation – Despite the tensions arising 
from the Israeli-Arab conflict, increased cooperation with European states will ultimately 
benefit Israel and the European states involved. Arad, Eran, and Steiner hold that the 
evolution of collaboration between the United States and Europe has become the 
“nucleus of world politics.”34 The entrenchment of the United States and European 
countries in the Middle East only broadens the need for Israeli policy makers to become a 
part of the trans-Atlantic cooperation. The volatility of rising threats in the Middle East 
will increase European and American interest in the region. The fact that NATO faces 
threats that are similar to those confronting Israel will eventually lead to closer ties. 
Israel’s prolonged experience with countering Islamic extremist threats has enabled Israel 
to teach anti-terrorism techniques to the United States.35 Additionally, with an Israeli-
European forum, misconceptions can be alleviated, promoting a broader sense of unity. 
However, some observers argue that a broadened partnership with Europe would 
constrain the Israeli agenda and could prove to be useless.36 Israel has been able to 
defend itself from multilateral and broad threats.37 Israeli contends daily with threats to 
its existence from militant groups and Arab states. A multilateral partnership with NATO 
may impede Israel’s ability to take military action on its own. 
The Need for a Step by Step Process – A closer NATO–Israeli partnership can 
only be achieved with a step by step process. First, Israel must “preserve and enhance its 
bilateral strategic alliance with the United States.”38 In the second step, Israeli politicians 
must come to the understanding that “NATO membership does not necessarily connote a 
loss of independent strategic freedom of action.”39 Since the establishment of the State of 
                                                 
34 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 4–6. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 4. 
38 Ibid., 6–7. 
39 Ibid., 7–9. 
 9 
Israel, politicians have emerged from the ranks of the Israeli Defense Force. Israeli 
policies have been designed to counter the constant threat to Israel’s existence.40 Arad, 
Eran, and Steiner assert that NATO should be utilized as a forum for resolving all Israeli-
European diplomatic disputes before a greater NATO-Israeli partnership can be 
established.41 With the creation of a NATO-Israeli forum, they argue, diplomatic ties 
between the parties will strengthen. Lastly, Israel must settle the conflict with the 
Palestinians because NATO will not align with a state already at war.42 
Turkish – Israeli Dilemma – Tommy Steiner has argued that Turkey should take a 
role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of the oldest NATO members, 
Turkey has taken every opportunity to exclude Israel from NATO and international 
forums, operations, and exercises since 2008.43 He contends that the support of Turkey is 
important to the progress of multilateral peace negotiations involving Israel. If Turkey 
took steps to create a forum for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Steiner has asserted, it 




The Israeli-Palestinian conflict plays a large role in Israel’s international isolation. 
Helga Haftendorn, professor emeritus at the Free University of Berlin, has added, “if 
Israel joined NATO, would the Palestinians not demand similar security guarantees 
before accepting Israel’s right to exist?”45 Through bilateral agreements and self-reliance, 
Israel has been able to defend its borders. However, internal strife and the Palestinian 
conflict will continue to lead many countries to ostracize Israel. According to Zaki 
Shalom of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, NATO will “hesitate to establish full 
relations with Israel as long the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues and a political 
                                                 
40 Arad, Eran, and Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euro-Atlantic Community,” 6. 
41 Ibid., 6–13. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Steiner, “NATO-Israel Relations.” 
44 Ibid. 
45 Helga Haftendorn, “Israel in NATO–Why it Won’t Work,” Internationale Politik 7, no. 4 (Fall 
2006), https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/21573. 
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agreement is not in sight.”46 The multinational Middle Eastern problems will ultimately 
require multilateral solutions that include Israel. Shalom contends that the “diplomatic, 
strategic-defense, military technological, and economic advantages” of a greater 
partnership with NATO should be used to entice Israel into a Palestinian peace 
agreement.47 Israel must make strides to resolve the Palestinian conflict or continue to 
face growing international isolationism. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will frame the argument by initially providing historical background on 
NATO and Israel, including their origins and key developments. Current strategic 
interests and conflicts will also be scrutinized in Chapter II. The evolution of the Israeli-
NATO relationship and an analysis of NATO-Israeli alliance constraints and benefits will 
be presented in Chapter II. The final chapter, Chapter IV, will sum up the prospects for 
closer Israeli-NATO cooperation, if not Israeli membership in the alliance, and the steps 
that will hinder or assist in promoting it. 
  
                                                 
46 Shalom, “Israel and NATO.” 
47 Ibid. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATO AND ISRAEL 
This chapter provides a historical foundation to the prospect of closer Israeli-
NATO cooperation. The origins, history, political interests, and security concerns of the 
North Atlantic Organization are briefly discussed, followed by an examination of 
NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. The section on the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue 
provides context to the overview of Israeli-NATO cooperation and leads to a brief 
discussion of Israel since its inception. Israel’s security concerns, political system, and 
contemporary issues are depicted. Given the dynamics of Israeli-American and Israeli-
Turkish relations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stands out as the main obstacle to a 
closer Israeli-NATO partnership. 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NATO 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949. Although 
references to a possible post-war alliance can be traced back to speeches during World 
War II, the catalyst that ultimately drew Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States to begin negotiations was the rise of tensions between the Soviet Union and 
Western countries. Upon the conclusion of World War II, “the Soviet Union’s leader, 
Joseph Stalin, made clear his intention to establish Communist regimes wherever the 
Soviet Armed Forces could reach.”48 Stalin’s communist ambitions were manifested in 
newly acquired Eastern European Soviet territories, over twice the size of West 
Germany.49 Prior to the inception of the alliance, the United States was already 
establishing anti-communist policies. The Truman Doctrine was based on George F. 
Kennan’s famous theory that the USSR could only be managed through containment. 
Combined with the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine was an official American 
strategy to prevent the spread of Communism. In a Soviet retort, in September 1947, 
Stalin founded the Communist Information Bureau, in order to promote and organize 
communist movements. The failure of diplomacy within the Council of Foreign 
                                                 
48 David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 3. 
49 Ibid. 
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Ministers, the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Blockade of Berlin 
set the stage for Canada, ten Western European states, and the United States to form an 
alliance able to deter further Soviet encroachment. Signed on April 4, 1949, the North 
Atlantic Treaty was concluded by twelve countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. The Allies agreed that “an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”50 Although the 
foundation of the alliance was a shared commitment to deter “Soviet expansionism,”51 
the objectives of the Allies also included “forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism 
in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging 
European political integration.”52 
The organization, structure, and effectiveness of NATO began to mature shortly 
after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although at the onset the Alliance did not 
have a military structure, the “Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949”53 and the 
“North Korean invasion of South Korea”54 in 1950 illustrated “the need for a standing 
military structure.”55 NATO’s deterrence policy was described as consistent with the 
United States “doctrine of Massive Retaliation.”56 The doctrine encompassed threatening 
a nuclear response to a Soviet attack. With the political-military postures of NATO and 
the Soviet Union firmly in place during the era of the Cold War, Western Europe 
progressively cultivated stability and economic prosperity. NATO was expanded with 
“Greece and Turkey in 1952 … and West Germany in 1955.”57 In response to NATO 
expansion, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact in 1955, re-affirming Cold War 
                                                 
50 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 




54 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 4. 
55 Ibid. 
56 NATO, “Short History of NATO.” 
57 Ibid. 
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contentions. With Moscow’s concurrence the German Democratic Republic erected the 
Berlin Wall in 1961.58 
From 1950 to the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991, the history of NATO and 
the Soviet Union involved periods of tension as well as phases described as “détente, 
[and] acceptance of the status quo.”59 Although crises and proxy wars tirelessly 
reaffirmed the Cold War phenomena, Western diplomats began to pursue an easing of 
tensions through policy changes. In 1967, NATO adopted the policy of Flexible 
Response.60 NATO’s role as a defensive organization, described in a report entitled “The 
Future Tasks of the Alliance,”61 and delivered “in December 1967 by Belgian Foreign 
Minister Pierre Harmel to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), recommended that NATO 
should have a political track promoting dialogue”62 and positive political change of the 
“status quo, not preserving it.”63 In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe concluded the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union, other members of the 
Warsaw Pact, the NATO Allies, and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic region (except 
for Albania) agreed on the “fundamental freedom of their citizens, including the freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion or belief,”64 “confidence-building measures,” and 
“respecting the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of states.”65 The 
Helsinki Final Act did not conclude the Cold War, but it did set a precedent for 
significant negotiations and diplomacy. 
After an escalation in tensions and a showdown between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed 
in 1987. The signing of this Treaty is “regarded as the initial indication that the Cold War 
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was coming to an end.”66 Throughout the Cold War, the USSR and its allies attempted to 
match the military industrialization of the United States and its allies. Soviet military 
spending soon took a toll on the economy, which was only one-third that of the United 
States.67 Communism began collapsing in Europe in the 1980s and the Warsaw Pact 
crumbled. Internal strife and economic dysfunctions within the USSR led to Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s reforms. The collapse of East Germany and the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 
triumph of democratic activists within most of the states of the Warsaw Pact underscored 
the final phases of the Cold War with the disintegration of communist regimes. 
The alliance that was established mainly to deter Soviet aggression began 
focusing on new missions. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created 
in 1991 and transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. The NACC 
promoted political stability and democratic practices in post-communist states. Out of 
NATO’s new mission of cooperative security emerged Partnership for Peace, the 
Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. 
NATO’s involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo, and other parts of the former 
Yugoslavia changed the alliance from a reactive entity to a proactive intervener. NATO’s 
1999 Strategic Concept took note of the emergence of “complex new risks to Euro-
Atlantic peace and stability.”68 The threat of extremism and terrorism was evident in the 
September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Terrorism arising from the 
instability of failed states was now not only a domestic issue, but an international security 
concern. NATO’s commitment to the security of its member nations and international 
partners took the alliance to Afghanistan. In support of an all-encompassing mission of 
stabilization, the Alliance and the Russian Federation created the NATO-Russia Council 
in 2002 to “work as equal partners on security issues of common interest.”69 The Istanbul 
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Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2004, offered “bilateral security cooperation to 
countries of the broader Middle East region.”70 
There are a total of 28 member countries in NATO today.71 In the latest Strategic 
Concept, published in Lisbon in 2010, the Alliance asserted that “crises and conflicts 
beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and 
populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent 
crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.”72 
NATO has dramatically changed throughout its history, meeting the needs and threats of 
the various eras. The dynamic political shifts and diverse crises of modern times, 
compounded with extremism, constitute a constant challenge that NATO is addressing in 
a multi-faceted approach. NATO defines itself as “an essential source of stability in this 
unpredictable world.”73 
1. NATO 2010 Strategic Concept 
NATO persistently seeks to gauge and assess the security concerns of the 
transatlantic region and abroad, evaluating the changing environment, and adapting to 
address its needs.74 NATO’s Strategic Concept is the official NATO policy delineating 
the Alliance’s “enduring purpose … to safeguard the freedom and security of its 
members.”75 The strategic concept incorporates an assessment of the evolving “security 
environment” that “contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of 
NATO’s territory and populations.”76 The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept stressed the 
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significance and importance of working with partners across the globe.77 Much of 
NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept takes into account the events of 9/11, the rise of 
extremism, and the Balkan conflicts. The NATO Strategic Concept includes guidelines 
for the allocation of diverse resources to address various issues such as arms control, the 
Alliance’s nuclear posture, cooperative security, and NATO enlargement.78 
Entitled “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” the 2010 Strategic Concept is 
grounded on three essential core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and 
cooperative security.79 Collective defense, according to Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, affirms assistance from the Alliance in response to an attack on a member state.80 
Through collective defense, “based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional 
capabilities,” NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept confirms the Alliance’s greatest 
responsibility and overall strategy of deterrence.81 The Strategic Concept contends that 
“NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to 
help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security.”82 In 
addition, the latest Strategic Concept further clarifies the necessity of mutual assistance in 
dealing with “emerging security challenges” where the threat involves “the fundamental 
security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.”83 
The 2010 Strategic Concept also discusses the requisites for crisis management. 
With a “robust set of political and military capabilities,” NATO will address “the full 
spectrum of crises – before, during, and after conflicts.”84 The security of the Alliance 
will be protected through a proactive approach, and an extensive set of tools, to mitigate 
crises “before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect 
Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that 
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contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.”85 Lastly, within the core task of cooperative 
security, the latest Strategic Concept asserts that the “Alliance is affected by, and can 
affect, political and security developments beyond its borders.”86 NATO will support 
regional stability through dialogue and training. The Allies hold that “the promotion of 
Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships 
with countries and organizations around the globe.”87 The Strategic Concept further 
states that “the Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through 
partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing 
actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to 
membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s 
standards.”88 NATO enlargement is pursued as part of the core task of cooperative 
security in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The Allies continue to rely on the 1995 Study on 
NATO Enlargement, which says that new Allies must respect “common values of 
individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”89 
The 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is NATO’s latest adaptation, 
based on experience and evaluation, to the changing security environment of the 
Alliance. Although nuclear and conventional forces are reemphasized as the core of the 
NATO’s deterrence posture in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, the 2012 Deterrence and 
Defense Posture Review innovated in various ways, notably by emphasizing the 
importance of missile defenses as capabilities complementing conventional and nuclear 
forces. Moreover, the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review underscored the 
advantages of fostering international stability through proactive means in crisis 
management.90 The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, as 
well as the terrorist attacks on numerous European cities throughout the first decade of 
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the twenty first century, suggested that the instability and volatility in certain regions can 
affect the security of states within the Alliance. NATO, an Alliance of twenty-eight 
nations, has the resources and broad spectrum of tools necessary to promote stability. 
Through programs such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative NATO has proactively asserted itself in cooperative security by creating forums 
for dialogue in an unraveling and volatile Middle East, and providing a bilateral means to 
achieve greater legitimacy for the participating partners. Some partners evidently regard 
such cooperative frameworks “as an attractive means of countering pressures to 
undertake democratic reform.”91 NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept illustrates the 
Alliance’s determination to work with the developing world and become a factor in its 
stability.92 
2. Mediterranean Dialogue 
The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), created in 1994, aims to “contribute to 
regional security, achieve better mutual understanding, and dispel any misconceptions 
about NATO among dialogue countries.”93 Partners in the program include Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The format of the 
Mediterranean Dialogue is primarily in the structure of NATO+1. However, “the 
dialogue … allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis (NATO+7).”94 
Multilateral assemblies are held twice a year and involve civilian and military 
representatives.95 According to NATO, Mediterranean Dialogue development is based on 
the following principles: non-discrimination, self-differentiation, inclusiveness, two-way 
engagement, non-imposition, complementarity and mutual reinforcement, and diversity.96 
The Mediterranean Dialogue was designed to be flexible in order to promote dialogue 
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and permit growth.97 The importance of the Mediterranean Dialogue was underscored at 
the Istanbul Summit of 2004, when “NATO’s Heads of State and Government elevated 
the MD to a genuine partnership through the establishment of a more ambitious and 
expanded framework.”98 Prior to 2004, the Mediterranean Dialogue was seen as lacking 
in substance. Since the Istanbul Summit in 2004, the Dialogue “has been expanded 
progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 
2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011.”99 
The Mediterranean Dialogue is structured through the annual Work Program. The 
annual Work Program, “which aims at enhancing” the “partnership through cooperation 
in security-related issues,” consists of civilian and military elements.100 The civilian 
component “includes seminars, workshops and other practical activities in the fields of 
modernization of the armed forces, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border 
security, small arms and light weapons, public diplomacy, scientific and environmental 
cooperation, as well as consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.”101 85 percent of the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Program (MDWP) 
is military oriented.102 The military component “includes invitations to Dialogue 
countries to observe—and in some cases participate—in NATO/Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) military exercises, attend courses and other academic activities at the NATO 
School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau (Germany) and the NATO Defense College in Rome 
(Italy), and visit NATO military bodies.”103 Visiting NATO forces and armed forces 
training are also included in the military component. 
In April 2011, during the NATO Berlin meeting, “NATO Foreign Ministers 
endorsed the establishment of a single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all 
                                                 








partners.”104 The single Partnership Menu became effective on January 1, 2012, “thus 
dramatically expanding the number of activities accessible to MD countries.”105 The 
broadened accessibility includes the e-Prime database; the Operational Capabilities 
Concept (OCC) to “improve partners’ capacity to contribute effectively to NATO-led 
Crisis Response Operations;” the Trust Fund mechanism; the Euro-Atlantic Disaster 
Response Coordination Center (EADRCC); the Partnership Action Plan Against 
Terrorism (PAP-T); the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) action plan; and the NATO 
Training Cooperation Initiative, which “aims at complementing existing cooperation 
activities developed in the MD framework.”106 
In conjunction with the Mediterranean Dialogue the Individual Partnership and 
Cooperation Program (IPCP) deepens bilateral political dialogue. The IPCP tailors 
“cooperation with NATO according to key national security needs, framing NATO 
cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries in a more strategic way.”107 
According to the NATO website, “Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and 
Tunisia have all agreed tailored Individual Cooperation Programme with NATO.”108 The 
IPCP “is the main instrument of focused cooperation between NATO and MD 
countries.”109 
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ISRAEL 
Fostered by European Zionist leaders, the partitioning plan for what was known 
as Palestine, governed for twenty years under a British mandate, was formalized by the 
United Nations in November 1947.110 UN endorsement of the partition plan was 
immediately followed by Jewish and Arab clashes in the region that marked the 
                                                 






110 David W. Lesch, Mark L. Haas, eds., The Middle East and the United States, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO, 
Westview Press, 2014), 2 
 21 
beginning of the current Israeli-Arab conflict.111 After several months of instability, the 
Jewish population organized and announced the establishment of the State of Israel on 
May 14, 1948.112 Immediately recognized by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
United Nations, Israel was faced with war on the second day of its inception.113 The 
armed forces of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan all attempted to invade the newly 
established state with dire results.114 The first Israeli-Arab war ended with Israel 
increasing its initial territory by nearly fifty percent.115 The consequential territorial 
disputes involving contemporary Israel are the result of over half a century of conflict 
between Israelis and Arabs.116 The first Israeli-Arab war was followed by the Suez War 
of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the conflicts in 
Lebanon in 1982 and 2006, and various Palestinian uprisings.117 
The Six Day War in 1967 is due noteworthy consideration as it “radically 
transformed the nature of regional politics and the relationship between local states and 
the superpowers.”118 The war created a persistent Palestinian refugee issue, enlarged the 
area of Israel to the disputed borders of contemporary times, and created a “polarization 
of the Arab-Israel conflict along East-West lines.”119 Arab states formed the impression 
that the “United States had colluded with Israel to destroy the ‘revolutionary Arab 
regimes which had refused to be a part of the Western sphere of influence.’”120 The Cold 
War between the Soviet Union and the United States encroached on the Middle Eastern 
region, driving the Israelis and Arabs into a proxy war.121 Egyptian forces mobilized 
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against Israel in response to fabricated Soviet information of an Israeli advance. The 
Soviets “alleged that concentrations of Israeli troops” were massing near the Egyptian 
border, driving Egypt to prepare for war.122 The Six Day War began with the State of 
Israel preemptively attacking Egyptian airfields. Even though Israel was converged on 
from all sides, “the Egyptians pointed to the fact that although the United States had 
secured from Egypt a commitment not to fire first, it failed to extract a similar pledge 
from Israel.”123 Gamal Nasser, President of Egypt from 1956 to 1965, also “asserted that 
the United States government helped Israel in several ways … providing it with 
intelligence and weapons.”124 The Six Day War ended with Israel “conquering the Gaza 
Strip, the Sinai Desert, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank including the Old City of 
Jerusalem.”125 Owing to an Arab perception that the United States assisted Israel in the 
Six Day War, the peace process and the United States’ role within it ensued with an Arab 
“polarized context of suspicion and distrust” of the United States and Israel.126 
The Israeli-Arab conflict entered a new phase with the Camp David Accords of 
1979, negotiated with the support of the United States.127 Egypt, under President Anwar 
Sadat, recognized the State of Israel and promised peace, diplomatic relations, and safe 
passage of Israeli ships in trade for the Sinai.128 In addition, the Camp David Peace 
Agreement set in motion a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, paving the path for 
Palestinian self-rule.129 Continued violence and stalemate in negotiations between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians were not overcome until 1993, with the Oslo Peace 
Accords.130 The arrangement and organization for Palestinian self-rule was agreed upon 
by Israel and Yasser Arafat, then the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
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The Oslo Accords led to Oslo II in 1995. This accord created the Israeli-Palestinian 
interim agreement, and fostered the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.131 In 2000, 
the United States unsuccessfully attempted to complete the peace agreement at Camp 
David. Arafat and the Israelis were unable to settle the last contentions concerning the 
disputed territories. 
Israeli security concerns can be characterized by the remnants of conflict, peace 
treaties, and most importantly, the unresolved Palestinian issue. The Israel Defense 
Forces (IDF) have continually shifted and adapted tactics to adhere to Israeli public 
sentiments and fears. Although the IDF have been able to defend Israel’s existence, they 
have also contributed to Israel’s political isolation. Crude videos of life in Gaza and the 
West Bank have drawn world attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
1. Israeli Security Concerns 
The effects of the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Israeli-occupied 
territories of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip characterize some of the 
key Israeli security concerns. The Israeli coast alongside the Mediterranean is not 
contested, except for the states and organizations that question Israel’s right to exist. 
Furthermore, over half of the borders that Israel shares with its Arab neighbors are 
disputed. In the north, Hezbollah, a formidable Palestinian militant group supported by 
Syria and Iran, operates at the outskirts of the southern Lebanese border and at Israel’s 
northern boundary. According to a senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs, Brigadier General (retired) Shimon Shapira of the Israel Defense Forces, 
“Iran’s policy on the use of force by Hezbollah, based on providing clear targets for 
Hezbollah’s long-range and short-range missiles, is meant to deter Israel from attacking 
Iran’s nuclear facilities.”132 On October 7, 2014, “Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 
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an attack against Israeli forces in the Shabaa Farms Region of the Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese 
border” that killed two IDF soldiers.133 
On Israel’s eastern side, the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and the 
Golan Heights are situated. The border between Israel and the West Bank is still in 
contention since the Six Day War of 1967. To convolute the Israel-Palestinian contention, 
various Israeli settlements dot the West Bank. The Israeli security wall, still in its 
construction and erected to defeat and deter Palestinian suicide bombers, is being built 
with no regard to pre-1967 borders. The controversial West Bank, semi-governed by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), continues to be a fertile ground for terrorists 
against the State of Israel. 
The Gaza Strip, which lies between Egypt, Israel’s west-southern border and the 
Mediterranean, holds the largest concentration of Palestinians and is the birthplace of the 
militant group Hamas and its political faction, the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel 
sporadically invades the Gaza Strip in response to the terrorist actions of Hamas, which 
are not limited to kidnapping Israelis, firing rockets, and infiltrating Israeli communities 
that reside close to the Gaze Strip. Israel has proactively secured peace treaties with 
Jordan and Egypt, but with other Arab nations contention continues. Statements by 
Iranian leaders, regularly threatening to end the existence of Israel, are often met with 
other Muslim nations’ applause. The enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been the 
foundation of Arab antagonism toward the State of Israel. Terrorism, Israel’s deepest 
security concern, will continue to burden the Jewish State until a resolution is found for 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
2. Israeli Government 
The government of Israel is based on a parliamentary democracy system. It 
includes executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The Knesset, consisting of 120 
members, is Israel’s legislative branch and parliament. Various political parties, such as 
the center-right Likud party, center-left Labor party, and various religious parties, create 
a coalition to form a government and elect a prime minister. The Likud party, led by 
                                                 
133 Shapira, “Significance of the First Hizbollah Attack.” 
 25 
current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been controversial in contemporary 
international politics.134 
Prime Minister Netanyahu, representing the Israeli government, has addressed 
terrorist actions with additional settlement building.135 The construction of housing for 
Jewish settlers continues to infuriate Palestinians, stall peace negotiations, and attract 
international condemnation.136 According to the Guardian, Israel’s settlement in the 
West Bank of 990 acres in September 2014 “comes after an apparently concerted effort 
by some of its officials and politicians to use the kidnap and murder of three religious 
students earlier this summer to justify the expropriation.”137 Many governments 
condemned the latest settlement building. Tizipi Livni, Israel’s chief negotiator in “the 
stalled peace process,” stated that “it was a decision that weakens Israel and damages its 
security.”138 Disapproval by the United States and the United Kingdom is met with the 
Israeli Prime Minister’s retorts referring to Palestinian terrorist actions. The Israeli 
government has been keen on expansion in the occupied territories, impeding peace 
negotiations and increasing Israel’s international isolation.139 
3. Israeli-United States Relations 
Since the proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948, the relationship between 
Israel and the United States has been controversial. Although Israel has been 
characterized (along with Turkey) as one of “America’s two most powerful and closest 
allies in the Middle East,”140 and usually with the connotation of America’s unwavering 
support to the State of Israel, the relationship between President Obama and Prime 
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Minister Netanyahu has been described as “frosty” at best.141 In a speech in Cairo, 
President Obama stated that the United States “does not accept the legitimacy of 
continued Israeli settlements” on territory seized during the 1967 Six Day War.142 To 
further complicate the Obama-Netanyahu relationship, in August 2014 it was reported as 
follows: “July 2014: Senior Obama administration officials learn that Israel has secretly 
been obtaining ammunition from the Pentagon, further eroding the U.S. influence on the 
intensifying clash in Gaza between the Israelis and Hamas.”143 The relationship further 
soured between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu when the Prime 
Minister told the White House, “not to ever second guess me again” regarding how to 
conduct relations with Hamas.144 Through the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 
Israel has maintained influence in the American political arena; however, the troubled 
relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu seems to reside in 
deep disagreements on settlement building and the Palestinian Conflict. 
4. Israeli-Turkey Relations 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has eroded Israeli-Turkish relations. Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “in the midst of his presidential campaign, 
equated Israeli policy towards Gaza to a systematic genocide and accused Israel of 
surpassing Hitler in barbarism.”145 Although relations between Turkey and Israel have 
been troubled since the political rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Flotilla 
incident on May 31, 2010 ended Israeli-Turkish political ties, but not economic relations. 
Prime Minister Netanyahu has publically and officially apologized for the incident and 
has offered “$21 million dollars in Israeli compensation.”146 In a public address after the 
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Israeli apology, Erdogan stated “there is no chance ‘to have any positive engagement 
with Israel,’ dismissing any prospect of normalization.”147 Despite the newly elected 
Turkish President’s comments, Turkey has attempted to play a pivotal role in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, offering to be the middle man in negotiations and providing a 
forum for dialogue. Additionally, in 2013, trade between Israel and Turkey “crossed the 
$5 billion mark, and data from the first six months of 2014 indicates a continued rise.”148 
Turkey has also agreed to sell Kurdish oil to Israel, demonstrating continued economic 
interest between the two nations.149 Turkey’s business and political agendas with Israel 
seem to be at odds. Although economic ties appear to be growing, political relations are 
at the lowest common denominator. Turkey consistently blocks Israel from participating 
in NATO exercises and activities and publically denounces Israel at every opportunity. 
Turkey’s political elites seem to capture and utilize Turkish anti-Israeli sentiment to 
popularize themselves. 
C. CONCLUSION 
NATO’s latest Strategic Concept embraces many of the same principles that the 
State of Israel advocates. Just as NATO has adapted its strategic position to the changing 
world environment, Israel has also transitioned to meet the new challenges of this era. 
Terrorism, extremism, and regional volatility in the Middle East have encroached on the 
European sphere almost as much as they have on Israel. Exacerbated by the Six Day War, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that began with the founding of the State of Israel 
continues to burden the Jewish state with growing isolation and condemnation from 
Muslim nations and European states. Although progress has been made in the Israeli-
NATO relationship, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and related disputes (notably in 
Israeli-Turkish relations) have stalled any possibility of a substantial alliance. Turkey, a 
member of NATO since 1952, has attempted to block all possibilities of a closer Israeli-
NATO partnership due to the ongoing Palestinian conflict. Steps forward in developing 
                                                 




the Israeli-NATO relationship have come only during times when the road map to peace 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis seemed clear and agreed. The possibility of a 




III. CONSTRAINTS AND BENEFITS OF A CLOSER 
PARTNERSHIP 
The magnitude of the Israeli-NATO partnership has expanded, but not to the 
greatest potential possible. This chapter examines the development of Israeli-NATO 
relations, and explores some of the constraints that have impeded the relationship from 
flourishing fully. Israel’s multilateral impediment, a derivative of decades of inability to 
promote Israeli interests within the United Nations, continues to constrain Israel’s 
willingness to conduct affairs in a multilateral setting. With a sense of isolation, Israel has 
attributed its survival to self-reliance. Avoiding the possible constraints of 
multilateralism, Israeli political and military leaders fear the restraints of deepening 
security agreements and international partnerships. Of all the impediments to a closer 
Israeli-NATO partnership, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the greatest—one that 
functions as an undercurrent to them all. Israeli-Turkish relations parallel the ups and 
downs of Palestinian-Israeli hostilities in the region. As one of the oldest members of 
NATO, Turkey systematically blocks attempts by other NATO members to deepen the 
Alliance’s relations with Israel due to its stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
After analyzing the various constraints, this chapter explores the potential benefits 
of a closer relationship for Israel and NATO. Although Israel’s small territorial size and 
marginal population equate to little more than that of a major American or European 
city,150 Israel and NATO stand to gain significant benefits from greater cooperation. The 
assortment of constraints impeding closer Israeli-NATO relations can be abated with a 
renewed, sustainable, and substantive road map for peace between Israel and the 
Palestinians, opening the door to significant benefits for both Israel and NATO. 
A. EVOLUTION  
Interest in the Mediterranean region and its growing instability stirred the fears of 
southern European states in the years following the end of the Cold War. European states 
that lined the Mediterranean “were concerned that the socio-economic under-
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development on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean could potentially ‘spillover’ to 
the north in the form of mass immigration.”151 Under the momentum of the Arab-Israeli 
peace negotiations “in the 1990s, the Mediterranean witnessed an outburst of multilateral 
initiatives,” driven mostly by France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.152 Of the many 
Mediterranean forums created, virtually by every large European organization, NATO’s 
Mediterranean Dialogue and the European Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
became the most recognized.153 Although NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue provoked 
skepticism in the first few years after its inception in 1994, it has become a corner stone 
and foundation to NATO-Israeli relations.154 
As the Israeli-Palestinian relationship worsened after the failure of the peace 
process at the turn of the century, and the eruption of the Second Palestinian Intifada in 
2000, progress within the Mediterranean Dialogue was slowed to the lowest diplomatic 
common denominator.155 The attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 
renewed NATO’s focus on the Middle East. Three years later, at the June 2004 Istanbul 
Summit, NATO leaders “decided to enhance our [that is, NATO’s] Mediterranean 
Dialogue and to offer cooperation to the broader Middle East region through the ‘Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative.’”156 For Israel, the Istanbul Summit cleared the way for “the 
development of bilateral tracks within the framework of the multilateral process of the 
Mediterranean Dialogue.”157 NATO’s interest in the Middle East, derived in part from 
the growing threats of fundamentalism and terrorism, the potential for explosive 
conflicts, the region’s energy resources, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, stimulated closer Israeli-NATO relations. 
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Addressing an Israeli audience on his first official visit to Israel in 2005, NATO 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated, “the interplay of Middle Eastern and 
transatlantic security is becoming ever more evident,” and “it is not difficult to see why 
building closer relations between us has become a strategic imperative.”158 In a press 
release, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom of Israel stated that the NATO Secretary 
General’s visit was an “historic event—because it is the first time that the head of the 
North Atlantic Treaty [Organization] has visited our country. This visit reflects the 
mutual goal shared by Israel and NATO, to deepen our ongoing ties and to realize the 
great potential for cooperation which exists between us.”159 
The Israeli-NATO relationship continued to grow with the conclusion of the 
Individual Cooperation Program agreement in October 2006.160 Israel was the first 
country within the Mediterranean Dialogue and “the first country outside Europe” to sign 
such an agreement.161 The Individual Cooperation Program agreement was a huge 
success for Israeli-NATO relations; it allowed cooperation beyond the scope of the 
Mediterranean Dialogue, which was “restricted to the joint agenda of the other 
Mediterranean Dialogue countries.” Further developed in 2008, the Israeli-NATO ICP 
agreement included “response to terrorism, intelligence sharing, armament cooperation 
and management, nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, military doctrine and 
exercises, civilian emergency plans, and disaster preparedness.”162 
Despite the success in closer cooperation, the Israeli-NATO ICP agreement has 
several shortfalls. NATO has been reluctant to let Israel move “too far” ahead of the other 
Mediterranean Dialogue partners.163 NATO has also “refrained from concluding a Status 
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of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries,”164 creating 
“substantial impediments in promoting the bilateral relationship and developing military-
to-military cooperation.”165 Notwithstanding the lack of a SOFA agreement, steps were 
taken—including an exchange of letters—to establish an Israeli Liaison Officer at the 
NATO Allied Force Command Naples in 2006, to participate in Operation Active 
Endeavor. However, Israel was not able to participate in the operation due to an incident 
and subsequent blockage by Turkey.166 In May 2010, Israeli Special Forces killed eight 
Turkish citizens attempting to cross an Israeli blockade of the Gaza strip. Owing to this 
crisis, often referred to as the Gaza flotilla incident, the Turkish government continues to 
block Israel’s involvement in the operation, even following an apology by the Israeli 
Prime Minister in March 2013.167 
Characterized as a progressively broader agreement by Tommy Steiner, the 
Israeli-NATO ICP agreement did not demonstrate all the merits Israel had hoped for.168 
Tizipi Livni, then Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in a 2007 
NATO-Israel Symposium, “Israel seeks a formal partnership relationship with 
NATO.”169 Jose Maria Aznar, a former Spanish Prime Minister, proposed NATO 
membership for Australia, Israel, and Japan, in order to confront contemporary strategic 
threats, in his report NATO: An Alliance of Freedom.170 Capitalizing on the dialogue 
about a closer Israeli-NATO relationship, Ron Asmus and Bruce Jackson wrote a policy 
paper exploring the possibility of Israel becoming a NATO member.171 A second policy 
paper, written by Uzi Arad and Tommy Steiner, explored Israeli membership from an 
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Israeli perspective.172 The interest sparked in a closer Israeli-NATO relationship was 
quickly muffled when “US officials expressed reluctance” and when in Israeli domestic 
politics the notion emerged that closer NATO-Israeli cooperation would in fact hinder 
Israel more than it would help it.173 A defense pact in a multilateral setting might 
“potentially impede Israel’s self-assumed strategic freedom of action.”174 
Promoters of an official Israeli-NATO affiliation reluctantly realized that “Israeli 
NATO membership was simply not on the cards.”175 The founding document of the 
Alliance, the Washington Treaty, would have to be amended in order for a non-European 
state to become a NATO member. Moving away from campaigning for membership, 
advocates “focused on upgrading the relationship to a status equivalent to the Partnership 
for Peace.”176 Pursuing a new avenue, “Ron Asmus, Uzi Arad, and Oded Eran outlined 
two scenarios that would engender such an upgrade – an Iranian nuclear threat or the 
conclusion of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement.”177 NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and 
the Alliance’s new Partnership Policy, announced in April 2011, streamlined the NATO-
Israeli relationship. NATO reformed its Partnership Policy and created the Partnership 
Cooperation Menu and Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program “to maintain and 
deepen the ability of partner forces to work alongside Allied forces.”178 Since the 
inception of these programs, Israeli-NATO relations have seen improved military 
security cooperation. However, the programs do not include the establishment of a 
SOFA, hampering cooperation to its fullest extent short of Alliance membership. 
Although NATO-Israeli relations have greatly improved, several other factors have 
hindered the cultivation of a closer partnership. The next section of this chapter explores 
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additional constraints that have prevented the Israeli-NATO relationship from attaining 
full maturity. 
B. CONSTRAINTS 
1. Israel’s Multilateral Hardships 
Israel’s limited experience in multilateralism is in part due to its tenure with the 
United Nations. Beginning in the early 1970s, Israel had great difficulty promoting its 
interests after the “Arab-Soviet-Third World bloc” joined “together to form what 
amounted to a pro-PLO lobby at the United Nations.”179 As a result of the bloc and an 
overwhelming Islamic state prevalence within the United Nations, an unprecedented 
number of condemnations and resolutions have implicated Israel. For example, United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, approved on November 10, 1975, identified 
Zionism as “a form of racism and racial discrimination.”180 Such criticisms of Israel 
within the United Nations have continued to the present. In 2006, Kofi Annan, then the 
UN Secretary General, acknowledged that he was “worried by its disproportionate focus 
on violations by Israel.”181 Persistently condemned, and with its interests marginalized in 
a multilateral context, Israel has avoided multilateralism in a world where globalization 
prevails.182 
Though Israel should geographically be considered in the Asian Group of the 
United Nations Regional Groups scheme, Israel’s membership has been—and remains—
consistently blocked by neighboring regional States. The barring of Israel in the United 
Nations Regional Group structure excluded Israel from sitting on any United Nations 
forums, such as the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, because 
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these bodies require participating states to be part of a regional group. In May 2000, after 
four decades of being the only UN member state that was not part of a regional group, the 
Western European and Others Group permitted Israel to become a temporary member, 
subject to renewal. In 2004, Israel obtained “a permanent renewal to its membership.”183 
In a press release in December 2013 United States Secretary of State John Kerry stated, 
“It goes without saying that at a time when the scourge of global anti-Semitism is on the 
rise, it is more important than ever for Israel to have a strong voice that can be heard 
everywhere.”184 
Israel’s negative experiences with multilateral forums have created a “tradition of 
managing its foreign relations on a bilateral basis,” and this, in turn, has constrained 
Israel’s experiences with multilateralism.185 Some Israeli political and military leaders 
view the Israeli bilateral methodology as a constructive part of Israeli security and an 
approach that preserves a freedom of action that otherwise might be limited by the 
confines of multilateral agreements. In their view, a closer partnership with a multilateral 
organization such as NATO might shackle Israel’s freedom of action in taking the steps 
that it deems necessary to defend itself. Many of the past Israeli-Palestinian conflicts 
were immediately followed by international condemnation of Israeli actions. Viewed by 
Israeli lawmakers and military leaders as necessary, Israeli policies to restrain Palestinian 
incursions and attacks would be even further scrutinized in the multilateral arena. 
2. Israel’s Self-Reliance 
Since its inception, Israel has been involved in numerous conflicts that have 
threatened its existence. Surrounded in a hostile environment, citizen soldiers defend a 
state in which the widest point is no more than 85 miles across.186 Under constant threat 
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for its survival, the military culture within the state is deeply imbedded within Israeli 
society. With a population of a little over eight million, military technology and 
professionalism are consistently sought after and embraced in Israel. Considered to have 
one of the top military institutions in the world, Israel has been able to secure its borders, 
and at times increase its size, by the sheer drive and determination of its military.187 
Defending the borders of Israel, the Israel Defense Force has an impeccable track record, 
from the War of Independence in 1948 to Operation Protective Edge in 2014. 
The military challenges that Israel has faced in its short life account for the social 
and military culture of self-preservation.188 One defeat in a significant conflict could lead 
to the elimination of the state. With the continuing security challenges and a historical 
foundation of fighting for the right to exist, Israel has embraced a doctrine of self-
reliance.189 Under the backing of its non-declared nuclear program,190 Israeli 
conventional forces are consistently praised by Israeli politicians as the only defenders 
Israel should depend on. Israel’s historical ability to defend itself, its doctrine of self-
reliance, and its leadership’s continued promotion of the self-preservation policy put in 
question Israel’s need for a multilateral security agreement. 
3. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
No greater obstacle stands in the way of a closer Israeli-NATO partnership than 
that of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ongoing land and border struggle interferes 
with NATO-Israeli partnership development in several ways. For example, the political 
clout of Palestinian sympathizers in European nations is widespread and substantial.191 
Many European politicians openly condemn Israel for its treatment of Palestinians, the 
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continuing settlement building agenda, and the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. In 
the past decade, condemnation of Israel has turned into economic and political sanctions, 
deepening Israeli isolation from Europe.192 Deteriorating Israeli foreign political 
relationships are not limited to European states, but also include Turkey and the United 
States. 
Since the Six Day War in 1967, the borders encompassing Israel, mainly in the 
Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights, have been in dispute and are designated as 
the regions in which mainly Palestinians live. The Gaza Strip and West Bank, with a 
combined Palestinian population of over three million, are usually depicted as areas of 
meager existence and the birth place of Palestinian resistance groups.193 The Palestinian 
insurgents, such as Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, have 
successfully mounted an international public relations campaign against Israel since their 
inception in the early 1970s.194 Despite Israel’s demonstrated skill in overwhelming the 
enemy and defending its borders, Israel has been unable to effectively defend many of its 
tactics on the battle front to foreign audiences.195 Demolishing the homes of the families 
of suicide bombers, attacking public centers where rockets are launched from, and 
enforcing a partial blockade to limit resources within the Gaza Strip and West Bank have 
been at the forefront of pro-Palestinian media campaigns, including social media outlets. 
Following every Israeli action to counter Palestinian insurgency, international 
condemnation of Israel is brought about by the skilled public relations campaigns of the 
Palestinian resistance groups.196 
The criticism of Israel has spread from public opinion and political discontent to 
diplomatic isolation.197 Although there has been a progressing trend in NATO-Israeli 
relations within the last decade, as noted in the previous sections, the protracted Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict has bounded the full potential of the relationship. Some NATO 
member states, such as France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, have openly condemned Israel 
and have warned against the expansion of settlements in the occupied territories.198 In 
addition to its public criticism of Israel, Turkey has systematically blocked almost all 
attempts to deepen the NATO-Israel relationship. At the root, Turkey would like to see 
the Palestinian refugee issue and the border disputes settled before Israel is allowed a 
closer NATO partnership. 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict will only be resolved (a) if Israel has an 
administration willing to negotiate the land, security, and economic disputes, and (b) if 
the Palestinian factions can align to form a unity government that can guarantee a stop to 
all attacks on Israel. NATO will continue to limit its bilateral ties with Israel, either 
owing to the objections of Turkey, or owing to general apprehension about deepening a 
relationship with a state in a constant condition of conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict will continue to impede any substantial bilateral potential for a closer Israeli-
NATO partnership. 
4. Turkey’s Role 
The Turkish-Israeli relationship can be described as a “fluctuating alliance.”199 
The unsettled rapport can be paralleled to periods within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Although Turkey was the first Muslim state to recognize the state of Israel, and did so on 
March 28, 1949, diplomatic strain ensued as a result of the 1956 Suez crisis.200 In 1958, 
under the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Israel Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion, “the two leaders secretly laid down the framework for a ‘strategic alliance’ based 
on the ‘peripheral doctrine,’ which proposed exchanges of intelligence information and 
cooperation in military technology between the two countries.”201 The renewed 
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diplomatic and military relationship was short lived, as the outbreak of Six Day War in 
1967 degraded relations. Turkey publicly condemned “Israel for its territorial gains in the 
War.”202 Relations further deteriorated during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when “Turkey 
refused to grant the right of passage through its airspace and use of its landing facilities to 
American cargo planes that carried urgent supplies to Israel.”203 The Turkish-Israeli 
relationship came to a noteworthy low in 1980, when Israel applied its laws to eastern 
parts of Jerusalem occupied since the Six Day War. Ankara reduced “diplomatic relations 
with Israel to the level of junior chargé d’affaires.”204 
The Turkish-Israeli relationship undeniably mirrored phases of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. As Israeli-Palestinian relations and the likelihood of a road map for 
peace developed in the 1990s, the Turkish-Israeli relationship began to improve as 
well.205 In 1991, diplomatic relations were elevated to the ambassadorial level, and in 
1996, the two states signed an extensive military agreement concerning assorted military 
forces and weapons development. Turkey and Israel became strategic partners in the 
1990s, as “both states considered that they were surrounded by the same hostile ‘rogue’ 
states.”206 
As the road map for peace between Israel and the Palestinians frayed in the late 
1990s and the Second Intifada erupted in 2000, the Turkish-Israeli relationship declined 
once more. In 2002 Turkish political leaders, such as Bulent Ecevit, then the Prime 
Minister, described Israeli actions in the occupied territories as “genocide.”207 Speaking 
in Istanbul before the beginning of Ramadan in 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then the 
Prime Minister, stated “we have been witnessing the systematic genocide every Ramadan 
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since 1948.”208 Turkish political condemnations of Israeli strategies for self-defense 
continue to undermine relations between the two states. In 2010, the Flotilla incident 
further degraded relations, and it illustrates the contemporary situation. 
Since the turn of the century, Israeli-Turkish relations have damaged and 
constrained Israeli-NATO relations. With the growing potency of public condemnations 
of Israel in the Turkish media, Turkey has also categorically blocked Israel from 
participating in numerous NATO exercises and events. As one of the oldest NATO 
members, Turkey continues to be the loudest voice against any improvement in the 
Israeli-NATO relationship. 
C. POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF A CLOSER ISRAELI-NATO RELATIONSHIP 
1. Benefits for Israel 
Although security considerations highlight the advantages of a closer Israeli-
NATO relationship, security encompasses only a fraction of the actual potential benefits 
Israel may experience. Israel might especially enjoy heightened international diplomatic 
relations, a substantially superior strategic defense, significant military technological 
advances, and ample economic growth and opportunity. In a world where globalization, 
international networking, and advanced modern states are terms used in tandem, 
improvements in the Israeli-NATO relationship could bring Israel numerous multilateral 
benefits that would outweigh many of the feared constraints. 
Israel’s diplomatic relations in the international realm have sustained significant 
shortcomings with the prolongation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As noted in 
preceding sections, Israel’s international isolation parallels the sea-saw of actions and 
reactions that occur between the Israeli Defense Force and the various Palestinian 
insurgency groups. According to Zaki Shalom, a senior research fellow at Israel’s 
Institute for National Security Studies and the Ben-Gurion Research Institute at Ben-
Gurion University, a closer NATO-Israeli partnership would “considerably enhance 
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Israel’s political status.”209 In particular, “it will be made clear to the Palestinian 
Authority and Arab countries, including Egypt, that the international community does not 
necessarily hinge cooperation with Israel on broad political agreement.”210 Although 
many NATO members do not approve, and more often than not, publicly condemn the 
actions of Israel to quell Palestinian uprisings, “this should not prevent them from 
establishing broad cooperation with Israel in the military, political, and economic 
fields.”211 A closer NATO-Israeli partnership may correspondingly “enhance Israel’s 
bargaining ability in its contacts with the American administration and also with the 
countries of the European Union.” As Israel will no longer rest its security solely on self-
reliance and the United States, its mitigated dependency will enhance its diplomatic 
negotiating prospects.212 
a. Strategic Defense 
Israel’s self-reliance policy and shadow nuclear program have probably deterred 
aggression against the state on some occasions. However, closer NATO cooperation 
could provide Israel with an enhanced deterrence capability.213 Belligerent states 
contemplating an attack on Israel “will have to take into account at least the possibility 
that Israel will not stand totally alone in the event of war with them, even if actual 
assistance is not obligated by the protocol.”214 Israel’s strategic defense would 
exponentially increase with the deterrent threat communicated by a close Israeli-NATO 
partnership. Aside from the visible capability that a firmer Israeli-NATO relationship 
would show, NATO could provide tangible military capabilities as well. Israel has never 
fought a protracted war against an organized military. Although the powerful Israeli 
military has won many wars with multiple adversaries, it has never needed to sustain a 
                                                 







war with a developed military organization for more than slightly over a year.215 Limited 
in resources due to its size, Israel would require assistance in order to fight a protracted 
war. NATO could hypothetically provide the sustenance and military backing whose 
absence would place Israel in a position of facing an existential threat. Through the 
Alliance’s visible and tangible potential, a stronger Israeli-NATO partnership could 
markedly enhance Israel’s strategic defense. 
b. Military Technology 
Advanced military systems such as Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome are the 
products of joint Israeli-American military industrial cooperation.216 Although Israel is 
considered to be at the cutting edge of military technology, “cooperation with NATO 
countries is likely to expose Israel to [additional] advanced technologies and military 
operations methods that will help it cope better with future threats.”217 The types of 
weapons and the military capabilities of Palestinian insurgency groups have significantly 
improved in the heated decades of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the weapons of such 
anti-Israeli groups progressively develop, while accounting for the close proximity of the 
struggle, Israel needs to maintain its edge in defensive weapons in order to protect its 
population. A closer Israeli-NATO relationship could open Israel to potential new 
“sources of information and methods of operation that up to now have not been 
accessible,” and provide fertile ground for technological military growth with new 
European and North American partners.218 
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c. Economic  
A deeper Israeli-NATO partnership may afford “Israel a special status regarding 
arms deals – both in exports and imports.”219 While Israel may explore and procure new 
European military technologies that it currently does not have the ability to attain, 
European states would also be exposed to “Israel’s special military-technological 
capabilities, including methods of combating terror.”220 As a result, closer ties “may well 
be the expansion of export markets for Israeli weapon and combat systems.”221 In 
addition to the sale of military equipment, closer cooperation with NATO may induce 
greater European market access for Israel. 
2. Benefits for NATO 
According to Tommy Steiner, Israel is NATO’s natural partner, sharing common 
values and facing common threats.222 José María Aznar, former Prime Minister of Spain, 
asserted that “Israel is at the centre of the global struggle between the West and the 
darkest forces of Islamism.”223 Regarded as a beacon of democracy in a region of 
instability, Israel has been facing terrorism since its inception and long before NATO 
realized the level of extremism emerging within the Middle East. Aznar further assessed 
that Israel’s struggle with terrorism is not only a battle for its existence, but a fight “for 
all of us.”224 Aznar equates Israel’s battle for existence with “the right of the West to 
repel aggression and to resist a mounting campaign by Islamists against us.”225 
Although Israel is a fairly small state with a population less than that of a large 
city within the United States or Europe, it geographical position and protracted conflict 
with extremism make it an ally that pursues some of the same objectives as NATO. By 
developing a closer partnership with Israel, NATO’s strategic challenges, “namely radical 
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Islam, global terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)” 
can be met with a partner that faces the same challenges and shares a commitment to 
democracy.226 Israel may not be able to provide a formidable contingent outside its 
territory to take part in a NATO operation; it can, however, support NATO anti-terrorism 
polices and strategies in a region burdened with extremism. 
D. CONCLUSION  
With a relationship derived in part from the fertile initiative and underlining intent 
of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, Israel and NATO have already covered significant 
ground in pursuit of a closer partnership. However, the extent of the partnership is 
constrained by Israel’s domestic politics, Israel’s inexperience and distance from 
multilateral forums, and most importantly, the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Exacerbating every other constraint, the conflict imposes the most significant impediment 
to establishing the fullest partnership feasible between Israel and NATO. A deeper 
partnership between Israel and NATO would produce numerous mutual significant 
benefits. As the capabilities and means of Palestinian insurgency groups continue to rise, 
Israel will have to make meaningful strides toward reaching a peace agreement, or face 
growing isolation and the escalating inescapable threats of a perpetually unstable region. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The depth of future partnership between Israel and NATO primarily depends on 
Israel’s willingness to reach a compromise with the Palestinians. The extent of Israel’s 
decades-old conflict with the Palestinians has not only contributed to violence and 
upheaval within the disputed borders of Israel and the occupied territories, but has also 
impacted Israeli foreign relations with growing isolation. The origin of the conflict can be 
attributed to several significant events, starting with the Zionist-inspired European Jewish 
exodus to the British-mandated Palestinian territories after the 1917 Balfour Declaration 
and the great upheavals of World War II and the Holocaust.227 Under the endorsement of 
the United Nations partitioning plan in 1947, Israel gained legitimacy and was soon 
thereafter recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union.228 
Proclaiming its establishment in 1948, Israel faced on the second day of its 
existence a combined attack by the armed forces of an Arab coalition.229 Israel managed 
not only to halt the Arab assault, but also to gain control over large tracts of land 
populated by a significant number of Palestinians. The decades-old conflict between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors has persisted with continued tensions and recurrent combat. 
The Six Day War in 1967—and the enduring results of the conflict—shed specific light 
on the turmoil between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel gained control of the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights through military means. Israel’s U.N.-
mandated borders are therefore adjacent to the occupied Palestinian territories.230 With 
many Palestinians in refugee camps, Israel has had to deal with Palestinian insurgency. 
In the decades to follow, the Palestinian dilemma within the Israeli occupied 
territories gained international notoriety through a well-organized and professional 
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Palestinian public relations campaign. Many Israeli-Palestinian interactions are 
publicized to present an impression of disproportionate and overwhelming Israeli 
counteractions. The degree of violence and the disparity of the means available to the 
Israelis and the Palestinians gradually developed the sympathy of many nations for the 
Palestinians. Support for the Palestinian cause has gained international traction and has 
been exponentially mounting since the early 1990s. 
Admonished and ostracized at multilateral forums, Israel has developed a practice 
of handling its foreign relations in bilateral venues, thereby minimizing its experience 
with multilateralism. This limited experience with multilateralism has not always been 
Israel’s choice. For example, although Israel has been a U.N. member since 1949, it was 
the only state to be outside the United Nations regional scheme for five decades, ending 
with its acceptance outside its geographical area in the Western European and Other 
Group in 2000. Israel’s limited experience within multilateral arenas has constrained the 
development of Israel’s relationship with NATO. Believing that a multilateral agreement 
might impair Israel’s military freedom of action in self-defense, some Israeli military and 
political leaders have embraced the Israeli doctrine of self-reliance. In view of the Israeli 
Defense Force’s undisputed achievements in war, and the long-standing United States-
Israeli security agreement, many Israeli leaders question the advantages of establishing a 
closer Israeli-NATO partnership. 
Despite some Israeli leaders’ disposition to limit Israel’s multilateral interactions, 
Israel could benefit greatly from a closer NATO relationship. The growing 
fundamentalism and extremism in the Middle Eastern region have affected both Israel 
and NATO members. Israel’s self-reliance doctrine is optimized for countering 
conventional attacks on the state, not terrorist actions by non-state actors. Facing some of 
the same threats as NATO member states, Israel, a beacon of democracy in the Middle 
Eastern region, would find it advantageous to align itself with the Alliance, and to deepen 
its NATO partnership in order to gain the benefits of information-sharing and proactive 
anti-terrorism efforts. A closer NATO-Israeli partnership in a bilateral setting distinct 
from the Mediterranean Dialogue would enhance Israel’s security posture, but would not 
limit its military freedom of action nor erode its doctrine of self-reliance. 
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Although Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty limits NATO membership to 
European states, it does not limit the depth of potential partnerships. In order for Israel to 
become a closer partner with a multilateral collective defense organization such as 
NATO, Israel and all of the other parties to the agreement would have to derive a benefit 
from the pact. NATO’s European member states collectively have limited power 
projection capability and require U.S. military organization and infrastructure to 
effectively employ the armed forces of NATO in expeditionary operations. However, 
Israel and the NATO nations share a common interest in the regional stability that a 
closer NATO-Israeli partnership might facilitate. Israel’s self-reliance policy is a doctrine 
that encompasses military action; it does not exclude the proactive promotion of political 
stability in the region. A closer Israeli-NATO partnership could include a bilateral 
commitment to prevent conflict, encourage peace agreements, and ensure regional 
stability by working as partners in a region torn by decades of instability. 
Closer Israeli-NATO partnership should be developed within the confines of 
bilateral agreements. Although some NATO member states do not share Israel’s positions 
concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there are many other security issues, such as 
combating the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations and countering the 
proliferation of WMD, on which closer bilateral ties would benefit both NATO member 
states and Israel without the complexities, limitations, and possible restrictions that a 
multilateral arrangement such as the Mediterranean Dialogue might entail. The bilateral 
accords that NATO has concluded with Australia and Japan might be the most promising 
approach. 
Facing an assortment of threats from common adversaries, Israel and NATO stand 
to gain substantial benefits from a closer relationship. Israel might enjoy increased 
economic opportunities and the backing in some circumstances of the Atlantic Alliance. 
NATO would gain a democratic partner in a region burdened with extremists and 
volatility. A stronger partnership between NATO and Israel would not only provide 
numerous benefits for the small Middle Eastern nation and the Atlantic Alliance, but 
might also foster the momentum necessary for Israel to successfully pursue common 
ground with the Palestinians. 
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